On the night of 19 November 2023, Sergio Massa, the representative of the ruling party Peronism, conceded defeat in the presidential election to Javier Milei, the libertarian who made a stormy entry into Argentinian politics. This election represents not only a dramatic shift in Argentinian politics, but also the beginning of a period of significant change in a country no stranger to dizzying upheavals.
Massa’s early concession of defeat, even before the official results had been announced, illustrates the modus operandi of the Peronists in their dealings with the Argentinian state apparatus. Was the data, which should have been securely guarded by an independent electoral authority, leaked to the government’s candidate? If so, it would be just another episode of explicit abuse of the government machinery in favor of the incumbent, in a campaign full of maneuvers that compromised the integrity of Argentinian institutions.
Massa’s campaign was a spectacle of political manipulation. The “acting” President, Alberto Fernández, was relegated to an insignificant role, while Massa, as de facto president, took the reins of the country. The legality and legitimacy of this novel type of coup is a matter for political scientists to debate. Under Massa’s leadership, the government stepped up income transfer programs financed by uncontrolled currency issuance. But the abuses go beyond these measures, which are at the heart of Argentina’s inflationary spiral. The destruction of the price system, the regressive distribution policy in favor of the rich, the blatant violation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law during the electoral campaign and the complete discretion in the distribution of import quotas in the framework of a wild exchange control policy are just a few examples.
The authoritarian and suffocating nature of the (de facto) Massa government manifested itself in situations such as those where people’s survival depended on political favors for access to essential but imported medical supplies. This violent, servile, and authoritarian approach often attributed to Milei’s party, is not a striking feature of Peronism itself in its Kirchnerist incarnation.
Javier Milei’s victory, which many consider surprising, is simply a reflection of Argentinians’ dissatisfaction with the status quo. After all, one cannot destroy a country’s economy without consequences. Known for his appearances on sub-standard television shows and his explosive temperament, Milei emerges as a reaction to the violent economic disaster of the Fernández-Massa era.
It’s tempting to attribute Milei’s rise to the alarming rate of inflation alone, which undoubtedly influenced the electorate. However, inflation is only the tip of the iceberg of a multifaceted economic crisis. The persistence of high inflation has not only eroded purchasing power and multiplied poverty rates, but has also destabilized the price system, which was already undermined by an irresponsible subsidy policy that diverted resources from basic services such as education and health, whose quality has rapidly deteriorated.
Under the government of Alberto Fernandez, Argentina faced several macroeconomic imbalances. From the outset, the government showed no interest in implementing the necessary reforms, choosing instead to postpone unavoidable adjustments. Far from being painless, these needed adjustments accumulated over the years, deepening distortions in resource allocation and investment decisions.
This scenario of hesitation and political inertia paved the way for the rise of a figure like Milei, who, despite his eccentricities, was seen as a sign of change in an economically strangled country. The destruction of purchasing power has led to widespread economic insecurity, despair, and a bleak financial outlook. This inevitably changes the social mood and increases the appeal of radical political alternatives. The election of Javier Milei should therefore be seen as a direct response to the erratic economic management of the Fernández-Massa government, whose only horizon was to avoid the cost of the deep reforms needed to make Argentina an economically functional country.
It is essential to recognize that the denial of basic economic principles, such as the relationship between monetary issuance and inflation, by Peronism in its Kirchnerist incarnation, is at the root of this electoral outcome. This attitude contrasts with the (albeit loose) understanding that many left-wing groups in Latin America have of budgetary limits and the trade-offs between inflation and fiscal balance. Throughout its years in power, Kirchnerist Peronism failed to confront these economic dilemmas and remained oblivious to fiscal realities.
Paradoxically, electing Javier Milei may not prove to be such bad news for Kirchnerism. As was the case in 2015, they will pass on the responsibility for the correction of the macroeconomic imbalances of their making to an opposition government. The left will not contribute to the reform efforts needed to restore economic normality without acknowledging its share of the blame for the economic disaster it left behind.
It is likely that the opposition will resort to violence in the streets, as it did during the Macri government, when 14 tonnes of stones were thrown at the Argentinian Congress in response to the approval of a pension reform. Milei’s election reflects the sad reality of a country that has elected a man with no experience in managing state affairs, without a technical team and without a solid political base, driven mainly by rejection of the economic debacle. Unlike the coalition that brought Macri to the presidency in 2015, Milei lacks a minimal program for the reconstruction of a post-Kirchnerist Argentina. Milei’s campaign has been characterized by erratic behavior and the marginalization of constructive debate, despite the publication of an interesting government plan that nods to the necessary balance between the free market and social protection. As one of his TV commercials shows, it focused on the destruction of the Argentinian peso, the Central Bank and the left.
Milei will face an active and organized opposition ready to impose the costs of macroeconomic adjustment on the new government, and will lack a clear legislative mandate. In this context, Argentina may well be facing a period of serious political turbulence. The example of Pedro Castillo in Peru is instructive. Not so much for his failed coup attempt, but for the slow and silent destruction of state capacity caused by political instability. Castillo’s reshuffle of 73 ministers in less than 500 days had a significant impact on progress in a number of areas of public policy.
Of course, the ineptitude of the Argentinian center-right is also to blame for the rise of Javier Milei. Juntos por el Cambio (JxC), once able to institutionalize a broad political agreement capable of curbing the most authoritarian instincts of Kirchnerism at its peak, lost its way in internal disputes from which the coalition was the only loser. It is regrettable that the center-right was unable to resolve its internal differences intelligently in an election it could have easily won. It is shameful that it had to ally itself with a political group that not only claims dictatorship albeit with some shame (represented by the obscure vice-president elect, Victoria Villarruel); that denies climate change; that ignores the relevance of policies in defense of marginalized and oppressed minorities.
Milei, on the other hand, was a master of political exploitation. By positioning himself as an alternative to both Peronism and the JxC, he understood that he had an opportunity. Milei has never shown any real interest in joining the opposition coalition, and even when he did indicate a desire to include Macri’s PRO party in his coalition, he was not serious about this intention. Many members of PRO, such as the skillful mayor of Buenos Aires, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, or Silvia Lospenatto, known for her historic role in favor of legalizing abortion, would never be accepted by Milei’s libertarian militants, who consider them degenerates or communists. Given the importance of the UCR (the so-called radicals), a significant part of the political force of the now almost defunct JxC in the Argentinian federal legislature, even if a significant part of the PRO joins the Milei government, it will be a government with a fragile legislative base and exposed to all kinds of blackmail.
An optimist might foresee the rapid introduction of a package of economic reforms led by Milei, a critic of the gradualism approach of the Macri administration. But this scenario is fraught with uncertainty. Although elected with a large electoral majority, Milei lacks the legislative and social majorities needed to support economic reforms in the institutions and on the streets, which will delay his ability to implement his programme. Over the course of his administration, Macri has faced many difficulties in governing and challenging the common sense of society, even with the support of a stable but ideologically diverse coalition and a modest (realistic?) reform program. Admittedly, times have changed and the appeal of the Kirchnerist agenda has lost ground among the youth and in public discourse.However, Milei has fewer resources and structures than his political godfather, newly converted supporter, and has promised a much more ambitious agenda.
Throughout their four terms in office, the Kirchnerists have shown a high degree of negligence towards the democratic and economic institutions and have led Argentina into a state of deep crisis. The apparent calm in the streets, marked by sporadic episodes of violence and looting, is the result of the Peronists’ tight control over social movements. In this scenario, it would be a mistake to give them another chance. Milei’s election therefore represents the lesser of two evils in an election marked by catastrophic choices.
It is plausible that Milei’s government will be fragile, facing strong institutional and extra-institutional opposition in the civil service, on the streets, in the arts and culture, and in the courts. However, there may be a window of opportunity to initiate the reforms that Argentina so desperately needs. Whether Milei will be able to seize this opportunity and effectively lead the country on a path to economic recovery and stability is a question that only time can answer.