Since 2016, Türkiye has enacted numerous laws and regulations that severely restrict press freedom and curtail citizens’ freedom of expression. One such measure is the so-called “disinformation law,” adopted in 2022, which the current government has used to detain many journalists. More recently, discussions have resurfaced around a proposed “Agent of Influence” law, drawing comparisons to Georgia’s controversial “Transparency of Foreign Influence” legislation. If passed, this law could have grave consequences for civil society in Türkiye. Last year, the proposal was rejected after being reviewed by the commission, as it was deemed unconstitutional. The government reintroduced and withdrew the “Agent of Influence” law for the second time recently, but emphasized that the proposal as a whole had not been entirely abandoned. AKP Group Chair Abdullah Güler stated that discussions with the opposition and relevant ministry officials would take place, with plans to bring the regulation back onto the agenda in the near future.
The question of why the government would need such a law is an intriguing question. According to Freedom House, Türkiye has been classified as “not free” in recent years, with existing legal mechanisms already enabling the suppression of opposition voices and civil society—often under accusations of terrorism or misinformation. Human rights lawyer Veysel Ok, Co-Director of the Media and Law Studies Association, argues that the proposed law aims to stigmatize civil society organizations as “foreign agents” while discouraging international institutions and foundations from operating within the country and aligns with Türkiye’s nationalistic-populist rhetoric.
The draft law adopts an alarmingly broad definition of “foreign organizations.” According to its preamble, “all institutions not established under Turkish law” are considered foreign organizations. This definition could include not only internationally affiliated journalists and civil society groups but also private businesses, academic institutions, and any other entity with foreign ties. The implications for private companies remain ambiguous, adding to the uncertainty surrounding the bill.
Compared to Georgia’s “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law, Türkiye’s proposal goes further in terms of punishment. The draft law imposes prison sentences ranging from three to seven years for non-compliance. This raises significant concerns, particularly for civil society organizations, as the law’s vague language opens the door to extensive misuse. For example, individuals could be prosecuted for actions deemed “against the security or internal and external political interests of the State” in alignment with a foreign entity’s “strategic interests or instructions.” However, the law provides no clear definition of what constitutes such “instructions.” Veysel Ok warns that even receiving funding for specific topics could fall under this loosely defined term, enabling the government to weaponize the law against a wide range of actors.
The law’s broad scope further extends to “internal or external political interests of the State,” which encompasses a wide range of areas like economic, financial, military, public health, cultural, and technological matters. Such a sweeping framework grants judges enormous discretion in interpreting the law, posing a significant risk to civil society organizations’ operations.
Another controversial point is that the law states that “The perpetrator shall be sentenced separately for this offence and for the related offence”. This contradicts Article 4 of Optional Protocol No. 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Türkiye is a party, which prohibits double punishment for the same offense. However; if this law passes as it is right now, people who are convicted will be convicted for both the related offence and being an “agent of influence”. It is also important to consider the financial support Türkiye receives from international organizations and institutions to which it is a member. For instance, although Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe, civil society organizations benefiting from its support could still be labeled as “agents of influence” under the proposed law.
The lack of clear definitions for criminalized acts or organizations leaves the law open to interpretation, posing a particular threat to human rights, women’s rights, and LGBTQI+ organizations in Türkiye. Stricter regulations and heightened scrutiny will necessitate stronger legal and financial resources. In my opinion, this could in return disproportionately burden youth organizations and smaller groups with limited budgets.
However, it is essential to acknowledge the resilience of Türkiye’s civil society. Despite increasing pressures in the recent years, civil society organizations have continued to advocate for rights and freedoms. While the “Agent of Influence” law may present new challenges, I believe, it is unlikely to extinguish the determination of Türkiye’s civic actors. Their ability to adapt and persevere has been impressive and been a key factor of their survival in recent years, and this resilience will undoubtedly continue to shape the future of civic space in the country.